



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

Executive Registry

85- 4234/1

25 October 1985

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Offutt Address

Our changes begin in page 6 of your draft. We have added a couple of additional thoughts that are highlighted on a new page 6. We have also added a fair amount of new material that replaces pages 7 and 8 of the original draft. There is a short set of talking points that address the restrictions of the use of satellite imagery at the "SECRET" level.

I don't see anything in your text that you should not say to SAC.



RICHARD J. KERR
Associate Deputy Director
for Intelligence

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ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
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5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
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9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
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12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO		X		
15	VC/NIC				
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SUSPENSE		ASAP Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

24 Oct 85

Date

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SECRET

Executive Registry

85- 4234

24 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Offutt AFB Address, 26 October 1985

1. Would you take a look at this and let me know whether I'd be saying anything I shouldn't say at SAC in the copy prepared for me at pages 3-9.

2. Also, I don't want to let the whole talk hang heavy on the quality and range of reconnaissance but give them a broad picture of what is going on in the Soviet Union. It would need to be supplemented by more specific information. The analysis helps us focus other collection capabilities to get additional information and our analysts in the Intelligence Community, with the knowledge they bring to their jobs regarding aeronautics, avionics, ballistics and other science and technical disciplines, interpret it into our conclusions about the capabilities of the planes, the fire power, the air defenses, and other elements of the Soviet military machine. It is this combination of capabilities which enables the Intelligence Community to alert our flyers as to what they may be facing, and results in the ability to design our planes, rockets and guns in light of the reality and capabilities of Soviet air defenses. The knowledge developed from this combination of collection and analytical capabilities has resulted in redesigning our planes to eliminate vulnerabilities, to counter countermeasures which the Soviets have developed, and in doing this to save the American taxpayer many billions of dollars.

3. See if you can develop that a litter further to bring out more fully the magnitude, strength, and importance of our analytical apparatus.



William J. Casey

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